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is utopian in Lecture IV, section 6 of Political Liberalism. But, if I under-
stand him correctly, his concern is different from the one I raise. Rawls is 
worried that even in a partly well-ordered society, we could not achieve 
stability for the right reasons.) If this is right, then Rawls’s project has very 
modest implications, delivering much less than nearly all of us have sup-
posed. It appears to leave the questions that political philosophers care 
about unanswered.1 
1I thank Chris Eberle, Arthur Kuflik, and Nick Wolterstorff for a lively correspondence 
about Rawls’s own views. 
Creation and the Sovereignty of God, by Hugh J. McCann. Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 2012. 280pp. $39.95.
PAUL GOULD, Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary
Rarely do we find a work in philosophical theology that is novel yet firmly 
entrenched within the theistic tradition. Hugh McCann’s majestic treat-
ment of God’s absolute sovereignty as creator is such a work. God is a 
perfect, simple, timelessly eternal being who, by virtue of his creative ac-
tivity, is solely responsible for the world and its entire history. McCann 
conceives of his project as “a study of God as creator and of problems that 
attend that concept” (1). And problems lurk around every corner, prob-
lems McCann adroitly solves as he defends his favored conception of God.
In chapter 1, McCann presents an inductive version of the cosmologi-
cal argument to show that the existence of the everyday world is best 
explained by the activity of a creator. The most important property the 
creator must have, says McCann, is aseity: “if the creator is to ground 
the existence of contingent beings, he himself must exist of his own na-
ture; there can be no distinction in him between essence and existence” 
(12). But here, McCann moves too fast. All aseity asserts is that there is 
no external explanation for a thing’s existence. It is a further substantial 
metaphysical claim to say that aseity entails that essence and existence 
are indistinguishable. Many will balk at such a claim, for it seems ob-
vious that the two concepts are distinguishable, even for a being that 
exists a se.
If the creative activity of God is alone responsible for the existence of the 
world and its entire history, then God is the ultimate micromanager. No 
detail is too small that it is left to chance or delegated to any subordinate 
agency or intervening mechanism. Questions quickly arise. What space is 
there for the operation of secondary causes? Is God blameworthy for sin 
and suffering? Call the problem raised by these questions (and more like 
them) the Problem of the Divine Micromanager.
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In chapter 2 McCann addresses the Problem of the Divine Microman-
ager with respect to the natural order. If the world and its entire history are 
the sole responsibility of God, we are forced into the following dilemma: 
either Occasionalism is true or secondary causation cannot be understood 
as an existence-conferring operation. Occasionalism is unattractive at best 
and at worst, as McCann argues, the physical world becomes a sham. The 
second horn of the dilemma appears no better, for as long as causation is 
understood as existence-conferral, there is no workable division of labor 
between God and nature such that God is still an active participant in all 
the world’s operations (30–35). McCann’s way out is to deny that causation 
in the natural order should be understood in terms of existence-conferral. 
Instead, causation is a process whereby conserved quantities of energy 
and momentum are transferred to produce new manifestations of what 
already exists. As the primary cause, God is responsible for the existence 
of all, even though the products of his creation genuinely interact and 
exert real influence upon each other. Thus McCann ably shows how God’s 
absolute sovereignty as well as the real powers and natures of entities in 
the world can be upheld.
The dialectical pattern of the book is also revealed: (a) God’s absolute 
sovereignty is asserted; (b) some well-motivated (even cherished) aspects 
of reality that appear incompatible with God’s absolute sovereignty (natu-
ral powers, human freedom, objective morality, necessary truth, God’s 
nature) are affirmed; and (c) it is argued that there is a plausible account 
of the latter which is fully compatible with the former. This result (c) is 
far from trivial—if successful, there is no need to sacrifice our commonly 
held convictions about God, ourselves, or the world—a result many will 
find attractive.
In chapters 4 to 7 McCann again addresses the Problem of the Divine 
Micromanager, this time with respect to sin and suffering. If God is re-
sponsible for the existence and history of the world, then it seems God 
is to blame for sin and suffering. But then, God is not perfectly good. 
McCann rejects the most common response to the problem of sin and 
suffering, the free-will defense, which places God at a distance from sin 
by making our (libertarian) will ontologically independent of his. Still, 
there is a version of libertarian freedom, one that rejects the idea of agent-
causation, which is compatible with God’s absolute sovereignty over our 
willings. God is creatively responsible for our willings, but not through 
some mechanistic relation where he issues a command and our wills are 
violently overridden. “He does not operate upon us, or from without; he 
operates in our very willing, so that his will is done through ours, but 
without any kind of forcing” (106). Perhaps we can think of it this way. 
On the standard free-will defense, God creates free creatures who will to 
sin, whereas on McCann’s story, God wills the sin of free creatures. As 
long as God is justified in willing sin, then God cannot be found morally 
at fault for our wrongdoing—we are in need of a theodicy of sin. We are 
also in need of a theodicy of suffering, for God too wills the harm done 
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as a result of sin and the evil that arises from the normal operations of 
the world.
Meaningful friendship with God requires that we be in a position to 
choose responsibly to accept or reject God’s offer of love, and such a posi-
tion can be accomplished only from a stance of sinfulness. Furthermore, 
the acceptance and overcoming of suffering contributes to our “soul mak-
ing,” thus securing the basis for true fellowship with God. The salvation 
and moral development of sinners, as well as the ultimate defeat of evil are 
great goods; hence God is justified in willing sin and suffering. But what 
about the unsaved? McCann rejects the idea that all sinners will eventu-
ally be saved, even as he admits God could bring all sinners to repentance 
simply by operating in his role as creator. Once admitted, I wonder, why 
is that scenario not the best possible world instead of our actual situa-
tion, where God consigns some sinners to damnation? McCann has no 
answer. Instead, we are to hold that unrepentant sinners are effectively cut 
off from the sustaining power of his creative will upon death, and cease to 
exist. Still, McCann thinks every instance of suffering a rational agent faces 
is ultimately part of some good to that agent. I find this hard to reconcile 
with annihilationism, for the cessation of existence seems to be a great 
evil, and it is hard to square this reality with the “overwhelming love” 
(154) of God. McCann seems forced to this position given his particular 
understanding of sovereignty, and one begins to wonder if the costs of 
such an extreme conception begin to outweigh the benefits.
The costs continue to add up in the last part of the book. Contrary to 
appearance, this is the best possible world (chapter 8). In fact, it is the only 
world God could create, for “prior to the creation of what is real there are 
no possibilities” (212)—God did not survey all possible worlds and choose, 
according to some principle of action or his nature, which world to bring 
into being. Rather, he acts with complete freedom and absolute sponta-
neity. Further, the moral and conceptual order, indeed God’s very nature, 
must not be ontologically prior to God’s creative will, otherwise, “he is re-
duced to a robotic existence” (199). Hence, God’s commands are the source 
of morality (chapter 9), and the natures of things (indeed all abstracta) are 
created by God “in their exemplification” (201)—that is, in creating cats, 
God creates the property being feline, in creating a triangle, God creates 
the property being triangular, and so on (chapter 10). Regarding God’s own 
nature, he is creatively responsible for it, without conferring existence on 
himself in that “that nature finds its first and only reality in the completely 
spontaneous act of God intending to have that nature—the act that is God 
himself” (232). As “pure act,” God is timeless (chapter 3) and simple; he is 
an “event-like” (228) concrete state of affairs (chapter 11).
McCann’s position is brilliantly argued, clear, and properly motivated. 
One is tempted, given the theoretical elegance of his account of God’s sov-
ereignty, to impute it with the stamp of truth. Still, I have my doubts. Chief 
among doubts is that it is not clear McCann’s position can be coherently 
maintained. In his unfettered freedom, God even chooses his own nature 
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lest he be constrained by anything distinct from his will. But it is hard to 
see how God can freely choose his nature unless he already has a determi-
nate nature—the very thing McCann is at great pains to rule out—mini-
mally; prior to his choosing, God must be such that, essentially, he is able 
to freely choose a (complete) nature. But, then it seems God is not solely 
responsible for his nature after all and McCann’s God is neither sovereign 
nor free. Perhaps, as I have suggested, the problem lies in his extreme 
conception of sovereignty. Perfection does not require it, and traditional 
theism can get by without it. All that is required for divine sovereignty is 
that no explanation trace through God to some more ultimate context. Why 
not understand God to be a substance, a fundamental unity that is the 
final explanation of all reality? If so, God is ultimate in terms of explana-
tion and control, hence as sovereign as can be. Regarding divine freedom, 
it is not clear that the above limitations would be of any real consequence: 
being “constrained” by one’s nature does not seem to be destructive of 
freedom. God is still the sole determiner of his action as creator, and his 
creative activity can still be understood as spontaneous and intentional, 
hence free, even if planned.
A final worry relates to McCann’s employment of perfect being theol-
ogy. A notorious problem for the perfect being theologian is how to judge 
between competing modal and value intuitions when erecting a conception 
of a perfect God. McCann’s more fine-grained intuitions can be challenged: 
contra McCann, some perfect being theologians think perfection entails 
necessary existence, and that God has the nature he has ontologically prior 
to his acting. Nor do all agree with McCann that perfection entails simplic-
ity, that timeless existence is the most perfect mode of existence, or that 
God always acts for a sufficient reason (the Principle of Sufficient Reason is 
not obviously intuitively true and may be false), or with complete sponta-
neity in creating. McCann may be right, but he is not obviously so, limiting 
his project’s overall appeal. My worries now stated, McCann’s book is a 
must read for those interested in God’s relationship to his creatures for the 
simple reason that he offers a solution that treats both seriously. 
Rationality and Religious Commitment, by Robert Audi. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2011. xvi + 311pp. $45 cloth.
JEFF JORDAN, University of Delaware
Among the prolific Robert Audi is a pace-setter with books and articles 
in epistemology, ethical theory, action theory, and sociopolitical philoso-
phy. With this book Audi explores issues clustered about the rationality of 
religious commitment, including the support which undergirds religious 
commitment and the challenges arising from the problem of evil and from 
naturalism. The book is organized into three broad parts, with the first 
